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Assessing Democracy, Market
Economy and Political Management:
The Bertelsmann Transformation
Index and Southeastern Europe
Summary
Indicator-based governance assessments support the precise description of 
differences and similarities among countries. But they also simplify a much more
complex empirical reality by focusing on its quantifiable aspects and by aggrega-
ting its different components and interrelations into abstract numbers.
To initiate a reflective debate about the utility of such indicators, this paper presents
a new indicator project that links numerical ratings and rankings with comparative
studies, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI). The BTI is a global ranking
that examines the political management of societal change in 119 countries on the
way to a market-based democracy. The paper explains why such an assessment may
be useful for Southeastern Europe, a region situated between the legacies of war-
ridden authoritarian regimes and the future of membership in the European Union.
We argue that EU accession and international agreements on questions of contes-
ted statehood are important for Southeastern Europe but should not distract atten-
tion from the quality of democracy and market economy in each country of the
region. We then discuss the conceptualization of democracy, market economy and
governance in order to derive criteria and questions for the BTI. The BTI’s metho-
dology of measurement and aggregation is explained in detail.
These sections show that the BTI differs from other indices by focusing on the
management performance of political actors, by using broader, more demanding
concepts of democracy and market economy and by relying mostly on self-collec-
ted empirical evidence. In contrast to numerical ratings on the one hand or purely
qualitative comparisons of countries on the other hand, the BTI allows readers to
simultaneously compare countries and to familiarize themselves with the state of
affairs in individual countries. Run by non-governmental organizations, the BTI
does not depend on political mandating or the consensus requirements of inter-
national organizations. The BTI and similar assessments may initiate public
discourses on better governance and encourage governments to engage in peer
review mechanisms and evidence-based policy making.
C·A·P Policy Research · 1 · 2005 Page 5




Brusis · Assessing Democracy, Market Economy and Political Management
1. Introduction
Assessing states and their performance through indicators has become a growth
industry. A recent overview publication by the United Nations Development
Programme and the European Commission lists 33 different sources of publicly
available governance indicators, ranging from representative opinion surveys to
expert polls and composite quantitative indicators.1 An earlier survey counted 178
different initiatives that took efforts to measure democracy, human rights and
governance.2 To construct its biannual synthetical governance indicators, the World
Bank Institute has been able to draw on a growing number of data sources, from
13 different sources in 1999 to 37 different data sources from 31 different organi-
zations in 2005.3
This development is not only driven by the recognition that the political institu-
tions of any country in the world can and have to be placed in relation to ideal
types of liberal democracy and market economy, given the absence of viable alter-
natives for providing a similar degree of prosperity and freedom. An equally
powerful driver has been globalization, by creating a demand and supply of infor-
mation that allows to compare distant countries quickly and easily. Moreover, to
address the challenges of globalization, states have assigned resources and tasks to
international organizations and agencies. Situated in a non-hierarchical environ-
ment of sovereign nation states, the UN, the World Bank, the OECD and other
international actors have come to rely on indicator-based cross-national compari-
sons as instruments to effect policy changes in their member states and to legiti-
mize their own activities.
In the Western industrialized countries, the changing role of the state has been a
third factor. It has paved the way from old public administration and redistribution
towards “new public management”and “regulatory policy-making”. The reorgani-
zation of public administration according to principles of corporate management
and the delegation of regulatory functions to independent agencies have necessi-
tated comparable performance indicators and performance assessments based on
objective standards.
For Southeast European countries aspiring to join the European Union, the EU’s
approach of a merit-based accession is a fourth factor facilitating indicator-based
performance assessments since the EU has committed itself to make membership
contingent upon a state’s individual performance.
Viewed from the perspective of domestic actors, a rating or ranking of their coun-
try in comparison with other countries can be a useful tool to stimulate domestic
debates about governance improvements. It can also facilitate lesson drawing and
policy transfer across borders, increase the transparency of government perfor-
mance and support convergence towards best practice. Domestic citizens or non-
governmental organisations who seek to hold governments accountable may be
supported by cross-national comparisons if other domestic mechanisms of public
accountability are weak.
While numerical indicators support the precise description of differences and simi-
larities among countries, they also simplify a much more complex empirical reality by
focusing on its quantifiable aspects and by aggregating its different components and
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interrelations into abstract numbers. These analytical tasks are inevitable parts of
measurement and entail numerous methodological problems that need to be
addressed by concepts and methods in order to ensure a maximum of objectivity,
reliability and validity.4 Even if an indicator is considered to be sufficiently objecti-
ve, reliable and valid, its utility will ultimately depend on the needs and percep-
tions of its (potential) users. Given the increase of governance and democracy indi-
cators, this utility will increasingly be determined in comparison with other indi-
cators that may provide more useful, alternative assessments of what the indicator
is designed to measure.
To initiate a reflective debate about the utility of such indicators, it is important
that projects to construct indicators set out their concepts and methodologies and
demonstrate the specificity of their approach. We believe that this debate should
be conducted among area specialists with a comparative interest, rather than being
confined to methodological journals. This is why we have chosen Southeastern
Europe as a special regional focus to present the results of a new indicator project
that links numerical ratings and rankings with comparative studies, the
Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI).
The BTI has been developed by a group of scholars and practitioners in the fields
of development and democratization who are collaborating in a project managed
by the Bertelsmann Foundation and its academic partner, the Center for Applied
Policy Research.5 The index examines the political management of societal change
in 119 countries on the way to a market-based democracy. The index is based on
detailed and systematic country analyses that are summarized in numerical ratings
and aggregated into two rankings and trend indicators. One ranking–the Status
Index–locates where a country stands on the way to a constitutional democracy
and a socially responsible market economy as compared to all other countries exa-
mined. A second ranking–the Management Index–classifies the quality of political
management in global comparison. Two trend indicators inform about the current
direction of development in terms of democracy and market economy in each of
the examined countries.
Within Southeastern Europe, special attention is paid to Albania, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Serbia and
Montenegro. These countries have been selected because two distinguishing fea-
tures place them in a particular transitional period. While they were able to break
with their past regimes and end the wars surrounding the dissolution of
Yugoslavia, they are still struggling with some legacies of those times, seeking to
overcome deficiencies of their democracies or market economies. While the great
majority of their citizens and leaders intend to join the EU, the EU considers them
as not yet ready for membership and has labeled them “Western Balkan”countries.
This transitional situation assigns a particular role to political elites and their
management, the focus of the BTI. Our grouping of the five Western Balkan coun-
tries, however, neither intends to neglect the significant differences among them,
nor does it disregard the similarities between them and other Southeast European
or European countries. One quality criterion for indicators should be their ability
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This introductory article provides a theoretical framework for the assessment. A
second paper places the region in a global comparative perspective.6 We start by
arguing that EU accession and international agreements on questions of contested
statehood are important for Southeastern Europe but should not distract attention
from the quality of democracy and market economy in each country of the region.
We then discuss the conceptualization of democracy, market economy and gover-
nance in order to derive criteria and questions that are used for the BTI. This is fol-
lowed by a section explaining the methodology of the BTI.
2. The primacy of democracy and market economy in Southeastern Europe
In the course of the last decade, democracy and market economy have been con-
solidating in Southeastern Europe. In Serbia, a broad and sustained protest move-
ment was able to oust the regime of Slobodan Milosevic from power in October
2000 and to achieve a democratic breakthrough. In Croatia, the parliamentary elec-
tions of January 2000 and subsequent constitutional changes swept away the
power structures underpinning Franjo Tudjman’s rule. Since then parliamentary
and presidential elections have been held in both countries. In Bulgaria and
Romania, the successors of the former state socialist parties, which had dominated
government until then, lost the elections in 1997 and 1996.
Albania’s and Macedonia’s major competing political forces switched between
government and opposition in 1992 and 1997 and, respectively, in 1998 and 2002.
Thus, the two countries passed the ‘double turnover test’ that was seen as an indi-
cator of democratic consolidation.7 Democratic institutions also survived major cri-
ses threatening the existence of the two states: the breakdown of public order in
Albania in 1997 and the clashes between ethnic Albanian fighters and the
Macedonian army in 2001. In 2002, state-level elections in Bosnia were for the first
time organized solely by the Bosnian Electoral Commission instead of the OSCE,
indicating the maturation of Bosnia’s democracy.
All countries of the region have established private property and markets as the
frameworks of production and exchange. The private sector generates more than
half of the gross domestic product, nearly all small-scale firms have been priva-
tized and the privatization of large-scale enterprises is in progress; commercial
banks have been restructured and independent central banks now control mone-
tary and exchange rate policies; prices for most commodities have been liberalized
and free trade agreements interlink all countries of the region.
Since the institutions of democracy and market economy seem to have become
consolidated, one may argue that public and scholarly attention should now focus
on the remaining and new challenges for the region: settling unsolved statehood
and ethnopolitical conflicts and preparing for accession to the European Union.
Statehood and ethnopolitical conflicts persist over the future legal and territorial
status of Kosovo, the preservation of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro,
the relations between state and entities in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the inter-
ethnic power-sharing arrangements in Macedonia. If the conflicting parties and
the international community will negotiate agreements to these conflicts, one can
assume that more stable states and constitutional frameworks will emerge. These
will then, as can be argued, remove the last obstacles to democratic consolidation
and foster the improvement of democracy and market economy.
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A similar argument can be made for EU accession. Bulgaria and Romania have sig-
ned their accession treaty and Croatia has entered accession negotiations. Croatia
and Macedonia have concluded Stabilization and Association Agreements to esta-
blish a free trade area and closer links with the EU and its member states, and the
remaining countries are negotiating such agreements. The preparation for EU
membership and membership itself will “Europeanize” the Balkan countries and
strengthen their administrative-legal framework of democracy and market econo-
my, thereby improving democratic quality and economic performance.
While we do not want to downplay the stabilizing impact EU accession and con-
stitutional-territorial settlements will have on democracy and market economy in
the region, we believe that the quality of democracy and market economy is equal-
ly and perhaps more important for the region, as a priority on the political agen-
da, a field of study and a focus of external assistance. We claim that high-quality
democracy and market economy should not be seen as a consequence, but rather
as an indispensable component and precondition of sustainable conflict settle-
ments and successful applications for EU membership. This contention shall be
substantiated by the following four arguments.
First, contrary to the prima facie impression of institutional consolidation, demo-
cracies in the Balkans are threatened by the disaffection of citizens and the rise of
populist and radical political forces. Opinion polls document a high degree of
disappointment about the functioning of democracy in most Balkan countries.8
Although elections are held and political freedoms are granted, all political elites
are seen as corrupt, self-interested and ineffective. One reason for this popular
perception seems to be that changes in government do not entail real policy chan-
ges. A type of democracy is emerging that is dominated by the “passing of power
back and forth between competing elites who are largely isolated from the citi-
zenry but willing to play by widely accepted rules.”9 This “feckless pluralism”10 may
lead to “the destruction of the representative nature of democracy combined with
the continued presence of its institutional shell.”11
Widespread disaffection with democracy may also turn into support for populist
and radical political alternatives. In Serbia for example, the Serbian Radical Party
became the most popular parliamentary party in the elections of December 2003,
and its presidential candidate was supported by a quarter of the electorate in June
2004. In the ethnically divided societies of Bosnia and Macedonia, citizens repea-
tedly supported nationalist parties that advocated the interests of their ethnic kin
group and challenged the constitutional framework of inter-ethnic coexistence.
These political forces are unlikely to reinstate an authoritarian system, but they can
curtail or weaken the civil liberties, political rights and rule of law that constitute
liberal democracy.
Second, while all governments of the region have successfully established macro
economic stability, the social and political basis of market economy is eroded by
the rise of the informal economy, state capture and social marginalization.12
Registered unemployment is high and characterized by high shares of long-term
unemployment. Most unemployed depend on the informal economy, family net-
works and subsistence production.13 The criminalization and corruption associated
with the shadow economy have led many people to believe that economic wealth is
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cultural legacy of collectivism and egalitarianism still present in the region.
Substantial groups of society have lost their previous social status or fear a loss of
their social status and thus mistrust any political or economic reforms. The violent
clashes in Kosovo in March 2004 manifested not only political frustation about the
unsolved status of the region, but also a dissatisfaction with the dismal socio-
economic situation.14
Third, the quasi-protectorates established by the international community in
Bosnia and Kosovo have certainly laid the foundations for democratic institutions
and procedures, but their long term effect is more ambiguous. Critics have charged
that the interventions of the High Representative in Bosnia tend to undermine the
democratic accountability of domestic politicians.15 Relying on the protector and
supervisory institutions of the international community, local politicians are incli-
ned to shirk their own political responsibility. Kosovo’s unsolved status and the
tutelage role of the UN administration provide rationales for Kosovo Albanian
politicians to explain and justify the violation of democratic standards in Kosovo.
In Bosnia and Kosovo, accountable self-government is still impaired and the func-
tioning of democracy will have to be improved if the two entities aspire for EU
membership.
Fourth, it is uncertain whether the perspective of EU membership is sufficiently
credible to provide an external anchor for domestic liberal reformers building a
constituency for market-based democracy.16 Triggered by the failed referenda in
France and the Netherlands, the looming crisis of the Union has strengthened
those interests that prefer to postpone further enlargements. Intra-EU views and
power constellations tend to determine the sequencing and timing of the acces-
sion process, ignoring the legitimation needs of domestic political elites. Liberal,
western-oriented political actors in the Balkan countries usually refer to the
European perspective in order to justify costly and conflict-prone reforms. These
actors, however, can not rely on safe electoral majorities firmly aligned with a pro-
gramme of liberal democracy and market economy. Moreover, the reformers’ time
horizon for delivering on their promises is limited, as the rising electoral support
for populists has shown. If the European perspective becomes more remote and
uncertain for the Western Balkan countries, the achievements of democratic and
economic reforms are likely to be questioned.
Thus, there are several reasons to assume that the quality of democracy and mar-
ket economy is more worrisome than the broad picture of institutional consolida-
tion suggests. European integration and new international status agreements are
likely to support the improvement of democracy and market economy but will not
be the encompassing solution to the problems observable. Rather, domestic politi-
cal elites continue to play the key role for preserving and developing democracy
and market economy in the Balkans. They matter for consolidating representative
democracy, rule-based economic activities, accountable governments and a steady
course towards EU membership.
Page 10 C·A·P Policy Research · 1 · 2005






3. Conceptualizing democracy, market economy and governance
3.1. Democracy
Theories of democracy and research on democratization have reflected the emer-
gence and remarkable persistence of new democracies across the world by asking
how well democracy works and how to differentiate the new variety of democra-
cies. Three main approaches of conceptualizing the functioning of democracy may
be distinguished in the literature.
A first approach is to adopt a parsimonious definition of democracy as a regime
characterized by electoral competition and political participation rights, following
Robert Dahl’s notion of polyarchy.17 A regime fulfilling these two conditions may
violate civil rights or lack effective judicial review, but is considered a democracy.
How such a democracy functions is conceived and studied as the quality of demo-
cracy.18 While universal, adult suffrage, free and fair elections, more than one poli-
tical party and alternative sources of information are constitutive elements of
democracy, the extent to which competition is fair and participation rights are
ensured denotes a quality of democracy. The respect of civil rights and the hori-
zontal accountability of rulers also tell about a high or low quality of democracy,
but are exogenous to the concept of democracy as such.
A second approach suggests a broader definition of democracy by arguing that
Dahl’s notion of polyarchy presupposes the existence of other components to
become effective.19 Democracy is conceived as consisting of five interdependent
“partial regimes: a democratic electoral regime, political rights of participation,
civil rights, horizontal accountability, and the guarantee that the effective power to
govern lies in the hands of democratically elected representatives.”20 This 
approach seeks to incorporate the first approach by considering a democratic elec-
toral regime including the right to vote as the necessary condition for the existence
of democracy or, to put it differently, as the decisive feature distinguishing demo-
cracy from authoritarian regimes.
But such a democracy is qualified as “defective” as long as one or several of the
other partial regimes do not function effectively. Various subtypes of defective
democracies are identified, depending on which partial regime is considered
defective. If all partial regimes function effectively, the second approach qualifies
democracy as “constitutional”, stable or liberal, thereby emphasizing the embed-
ded nature of modern democracy. Thus, much of what is seen as a quality of demo-
cracy by the first approach is conceived here as an inherent element of constitu-
tional democracy. Advocates of this approach, however, claim that a constitutional
democracy does not represent a perfect democracy and that the quality of consti-
tutional democracy may still vary and can be assessed.
A third approach attempts to avoid the normative and potentially discriminatory
implications associated with democracy by focusing on good governance. Such a
functional approach has been taken mainly by international agencies which have
defined governance as “the exercise of economic, political and administrative
authority to manage a country’s affairs at all levels.”21 According to the World
Bank, good governance is “epitomized by predictable, open and enlightened 
policy-making; a bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethos; an executive arm
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of government accountable for its actions; a strong civil society participating in
public affairs; and all behaving under the rule of law.”22
This conceptualization highlights the quality of policy-making and the political
process, but does not explicitly require democratic elections. While this distin-
guishes good governance from democracy concepts, the components of good
governance in the World Bank definition clearly overlap with attributes of demo-
cratic quality or constitutional democracy. Components such as “open policy-
making”and “civil society participating in public affairs”obviously strongly suggest
democratic mechanisms and may at the same time be understood as more
demanding than a minimum version of electoral democracy.
The second and third approach have guided the conceptual design of the BTI. The
index takes constitutional democracy as its normative point of reference and eva-
luates the governance performance of political elites. This focus seems to be parti-
cularly well suited to monitor the deficiencies of democracy and the crucial role of
domestic political elites in Southeastern Europe. In the remainder of this section, we
set out how the concept of constitutional democracy is reflected in the criteria and
questions used to construct the BTI’s democracy assessment (see table 1 below).
First, the criterion Political Participation asks whether and how well the core ele-
ment of constitutional democracy, free and fair elections, and the freedoms of opi-
nion, association, assembly and free media function. In addition, this criterion asks
whether democratically elected rulers have the effective power to govern.
Second, the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers with checks
and balances – “horizontal accountability”23 – and the protection of civil rights are
monitored by the Rule of Law criterion. Constructing the rule of law as a distinct
and constituent criterion assigns greater importance to functioning accountability
mechanisms than democracy assessments that focus on free elections and univer-
sal suffrage. Moreover, this emphasis on the rule of law pays particular attention to
the weakness of checks and balances that has been identified as a salient feature
of Southeast European political systems.24
Third, two criteria, Institutional Stability and Political and Social Integration
take into account whether and to what extent democratic institutions are consoli-
dated in terms of popular attitudes, behaviour of political actors and patterns of
political representation. These criteria and questions reflect insights from research
on the consolidation of democracy,25 but they also check attributes of the quality
of democracy. They also allow to monitor citizens’disaffection with democracy that
is observable in most Balkan countries.
Fourth, basic state identity and coherence are viewed as prerequisites of democra-
tic development. In the tradition of modernization theory, nation building, secula-
rization and the institutionalization of a state monopoly on the use of force are
assumed to precede the emergence of viable and sustainable democracy. The
Stateness criterion monitors whether a political system is characterized by unsett-
led conflicts related to these processes. Integrating stateness conflicts and rule of
law problems into the measurement of democracy allows to take into account
those problems of Balkan democracies that are associated with weak states.26
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Table 1: The democracy criteria
1. Stateness: There is clarity about the nation's existence as a state, with ade-
quately established and differentiated power structures.
1.1. To what extent does the state’s monopoly on the use of force cover the 
entire territory?
1.2. Is there fundamental agreement about which people qualify as citizens of the
state?
1.3. Are the state’s legitimacy and its legal order defined without interference by
religious dogmas (“separation of church and state”)?
1.4. Do working administrative structures exist?
2. Political Participation: The populace decides who rules, and it has other
political freedoms.
2.1. To what extent are rulers determined by general, free and fair elections?
2.2. Do democratically elected rulers have the effective power to govern, or are
there veto powers and political enclaves?
2.3. To what extent can independent political and/or civic groups associate and
assemble freely (“freedom of choice”)?
2.4. To what extent can citizens, organizations and the mass media  express 
opinions freely?
3. Rule of Law: State powers check and balance one another and ensure civil
rights.
3.1. To what extent are state powers independent and interdependent?
3.2. Does an independent judiciary exist?
3.3. Are there legal or political penalties for officeholders who abuse their 
positions?
3.4. To what extent do civil liberties exist and to what extent can citizens seek
redress for violations of these liberties? Freedoms in question include human
rights, rights to justice, bans on discrimination and freedom of religion.
4. Institutional Stability: Democratic institutions are capable of performing,
and they are adequately accepted.
4.1. Are democratic institutions, including the administrative system and system
of justice, capable of performing?
4.2. To what extent are democratic institutions accepted or supported by the 
relevant actors?
5. Political and Social Integration: Stable patterns of representation exist for
mediating between society and the state; there is also a consolidated civic culture.
5.1. To what extent is there a stable, moderate, socially-rooted party system to
articulate and aggregate societal interests?
5.2. To what extent is there a network of cooperative associations or interest
groups to mediate between society and the political system?
5.3. How strong is the citizens’ consent to democratic norms and procedures?
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3.2. Market economy
A socially responsible market economy is the other normative point of reference
for the BTI exercise. Whereas a narrow definition of a market economy focuses pri-
marily on free markets and property rights, the concept of a socially responsible
market economy complements this definition by the principles of social justice and
responsibility. This notion is informed by studies of new institutional economics
and the literature on the nexus between social justice and development.27 As for
constitutional democracy, the concept of a socially responsible market economy is
operationalized in criteria and questions.
First, the criterion Level of Socioeconomic Development monitors whether and
how the economic system and policy reduce or prevent poverty and social exclu-
sion. Second, the BTI assesses whether and how a country’s Welfare Regime
compensates for the main social risks of market economies and provides for an
equality of opportunity. Third, the Sustainability criterion observes whether eco-
nomic development is environmentally sustainable and underpinned by invest-
ment in education, research and infrastructure.
The market economy concept of the BTI is further operationalized in four criteria
measuring the quality of the institutional framework (competition, property rights)
and the performance (macroeconomic stability, growth).
Table 2: The market economy criteria
6. Level of Socioeconomic Development: In principle, the country's level of
development permits adequate freedom of choice for all citizens.
To what extent can one assume that fundamental social exclusions due to
poverty, education or gender are a marginal phenomenon?
7. Organization of the Market and Competition: There are clear rules of the
game for stable market-based competition.
7.1. To what level have the fundamentals of market-based competition developed?
7.2. Are monopolies avoided or combated?
7.3. To what extent has the liberalization of foreign trade evolved?
7.4. Are the foundations laid for a banking system and a capital market?
8. Stability of Currency and Prices: There are institutional or political
precautions to control inflation sustainably, together with an appropriate
foreign-exchange policy
8.1. Does the country pursue a consistent inflation policy and an appropriate
foreign-exchange policy? Is there an independent central bank?
8.2. Do government authorities give signals to preserve macroeconomic stability,
especially in fiscal and debt policy?
9. Private Property: There are adequate conditions to support a functional 
private sector.
9.1. Do government authorities ensure well-defined rights of private property and
regulate the acquisition of property?
9.2. Are private companies permitted, and are state companies undergoing a pro-
cess of privatization in conformity with market principles?
Page 14 C·A·P Policy Research · 1 · 2005
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A crucial factor
Broad notions of governance
10. Welfare Regime: Viable arrangements to provide adjustments compensate
for the social effects of the capitalist economic system.
10.1. Do social safety nets exist to compensate for poverty and other risks such as
old age, illness, unemployment or disability?
10.2. To what extent does equality of opportunities exist?
11. Economic Performance: The strength of the economy points to solid growth.
What quantitative performance do the macroeconomic indicators show?
12. Sustainability: Economic growth is balanced, ecologically compatible and
oriented to the future.
12.1. To what extent are environmental concerns taken into account macro- and
micro-economically?
12.2. To what extent are there solid institutions for basic and continuing education
as well as for research and development? Is there a modern infrastructure?
3.3. Governance
The debate among social scientists and practitioners about the meaning and scope
of the term governance has produced numerous different conceptualizations.28 Up to
now there has not been a convincing theoretical integration of these proposals that
could constitute a ‘root concept’ similar to Robert Dahl’s polyarchy concept in the
democracy literature. The governance concepts of international agencies are designed
to underpin their particular policy purposes. Moreover, they have to take into account
the limitations of their mandates, that is not to intervene into the domestic politics
of their member countries. This restriction is particularly problematic because com-
parative research has demonstrated that there are causal chains between the quality
of politics, political institutions, governance and policy outcomes.
Notions of governance developed in the literature on public administration and
public policy draw on developments in advanced, wealthy western states that have
little in common with the challenges for countries on the way to democracy and
market economy.29
Authors of governance indicators for developing and transition countries rely on
broad notions of governance. Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, for example, define
governance as “the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is
exercised. This includes (1) the process by which governments are selected, moni-
tored and replaced, (2) the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and
implement sound policies, and (3) the respect of citizens and the state for the insti-
tutions that govern economic and social interactions among them.”30 Hyden,
Court and Mease suggest an even broader, less government-centric notion:
“Governance refers to the formation and stewardship of the formal and informal
rules that regulate the public realm, the arena in which states as well as economic
and societal actors interact to make decisions.”31
The BTI concept of governance is narrower than these notions, since it is focused
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measure the management performance of a country’s political leadership with
respect to developing a constitutional democracy and a socially responsible mar-
ket economy. One may label this an actor-centered concept, which is also signal-
led by the use of the term “management”. Governance is viewed as the responsi-
bility, capacity and performance of leading political actors. The role of executives
and governments is seen as highly important, but is conceived in a functional
sense, in view of their contribution to management. Such a functional understan-
ding of political leadership implies that non-governmental actors are also taken
into account if they play an important role for governing a country.
This conceptual design seeks to overcome the limitations of “non-political”gover-
nance notions and the vagueness of encompassing systemic governance notions.
The BTI’s actor-centered concept of governance has also been facilitated by the
wider scope of the entire measurement exercise. Some of those BTI criteria, which
measure the state of development towards democracy and market economy, cover
elements of systemic governance concepts such as accountability, effectiveness,
fairness, openness, participation, predictability and transparency. This enables the
BTI to conceptualize management as composed of four criteria that reflect key fin-
dings of the literature on governance and policy reforms.
First, the experience with successful development and transitions has shown the
importance of state capacity. Effective states can initiate economic modernization
and were able to drive an economic catch-up process by channeling export reve-
nues into education, research and development, as exemplified by successful Asian
countries.32 Conversely,“state weakness”has been seen as a key reason for the cri-
sis of democracy in the Balkans.33 Unconstrained executive authority is required to
initiate economic reforms, overcome the resistance of status-quo oriented groups
and impose social burdens on the population in order to achieve long-term im-
provements.34 For these reasons, the BTI monitors whether governments seek to
achieve strategic goals, manage their resources efficiently and act effectively. These
management qualities are operationalized in two criteria: Steering Capability and
Resource Efficiency. Individual questions under these criteria draw on the list of
government capabilities used by Weaver and Rockman to study whether and how
institutions matter for public policies.35
Second, effectively acting and efficiently organized states were only able to sustain
development and reforms if they were backed by a broad support from society. The
“embedded autonomy” of these states ensured that their governments were not
captured by particularist economic and political elites and that the ruling elites did
not consume the country’s wealth.36 This finding of historical-institutionalist rese-
arch on successful development corresponds with insights from the political eco-
nomy of policy reforms. This literature has argued that higher constraints to exe-
cutive authority forced governments to engage in a dialogue with society and form
broader coalitions that, in turn, often enabled a political leadership to sustain un-
popular reforms. To consolidate policy reforms, governments would thus require
representative institutions that widen the social basis of reform.37
A higher effective number of veto points restricts the decisiveness, but increases
the resoluteness of policy making.38 Institutional devices that weaken executive
authority such as more frequent elections and shorter executive tenures contribu-
te to improve competition among political actors and thus reduce the blockade
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power of vested interests.39 In the light of these studies, Knack, Kugler and
Manning have suggested to conceive governance as consisting of executive capa-
city and executive accountability.40
The utility of consultation, compromise and consensus can also be explained by
the interaction of social capital, government policies and policy outcomes. Political
elites who cooperate with society may better use a country’s social capital of civic
engagement for collective goals.41 Furthermore, comparative research on transi-
tions to democracy has shown that negotiated agreements among major social
groups and political actors were key to successful transitions.42 The Consensus-
Building criterion has been constructed in view of these findings.
Third, political elites who learned from abroad and effectively integrated financial
and technical assistance into their own strategy of development have been more
successful than elites who misused foreign aid as rents or as a compensation for
their failed policies.43 Regional and goodneighbourly cooperation also represent
important areas of policy learning that can be used to guide a transition and deve-
lopment process. This explains why International Cooperation forms part of the
BTI’s governance concept.
Especially the Consensus-Building criterion reflects that this governance concept
is not only about effectiveness but also refers to democratic elements. It is assumed
that a democratic environment and democratic forms of participation improve the
likelihood of effective management. Conversely, the lack of democratic consensus-
building in most autocracies limits the effectiveness and sustainability of economic
reforms in such systems.
It should be noted that these criteria do not operationalize governance as a cata-
logue of reform measures required to establish constitutional democracy and 
socially responsible market economy. This indeterminacy is necessitated by the
empirical diversity of development and democratization trajectories and strategies.
Yet the emphasis on capacities rather than distinct reform moves also allows to
assess the potential of a political leadership.
Table 3: The management criteria
13. Steering Capability: The political leadership manages reforms effectively
and can achieve its policy priorities.
13.1. Does the political leadership set and maintain strategic priorities?
13.2. Does the government implement its reform policy effectively?
13.3. Does the political leadership act flexibly? Are leading political actors capable
of learning and policy innovation?
14. Resource efficiency: The government makes optimum use of available
resources.
14.1. Does the government make efficient use of available economic and human
resources?
14.2. Can the government coordinate conflicting interest into a coherent policy?
14.3. Can the government curb corruption successfully?
Linkage democracy and 
market economy
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15. Consensus-Building: The political leadership establishes a broad consensus
about reform with other actors in society, without sacrificing its reform goals.
15.1. Do the major political actors agree on a market economy and democracy as
strategic, long-term aims?
15.2. Can the reformers exclude or co-opt anti-democratic veto actors?
15.3. Can the political leadership manage political cleavages so that they do not
escalate into irreconcilable conflicts?
15.4. Does the political leadership develop social capital among citizens and social
groups?
15.5. Does the political leadership enable the participation of civil society in the
politcal process
15.5. Can the political elite bring about reconciliation between the victims and per-
petrators of past injustices?
16. International Cooperation: The country's political actors are willing to coo-
perate with outside supporters and organizations.
16.1. Does the political leadership use the support of international partners to
improve its domestic reform policies?
16.2. Does the government act as a credible and reliable partner in its relations
with the international community?
16.3. Is the political leadership willing to cooperate with neighboring countries in
regional and international organizations?
3.4. Democratization and development
The theoretical concepts of constitutional democracy, socially responsible market
economy and actor-centered governance do not imply an optimal institutional
model. Rather, these definitions simply delineate certain functions that can be
embodied in a variety of functionally equivalent institutions.
A constitutional democracy and a socially responsible market economy represent
goals, but not necessarily immediate priorities in complex processes of develop-
ment. In the BTI perspective, the aims of development, democratic transition and
consolidation are identical. Development comprises political and economic trans-
formation, while a democratization or a preceding authoritarian period do not
constitute necessary preconditions of development. Development and democrati-
zation processes are not sequential. They can overlap both temporally and in terms
of the problems to overcome. This broad understanding of development and
democratization allows to study developing and transition countries in a single
sample and by means of only one set of questions.
The BTI rests on the assumption that a constitutional democracy and a socially
responsible market economy are empirically and functionally interlinked. To
express this linkage, the term “market-based democracy”is used. Whereas features
of a constitutional democracy are found most often in those countries exhibiting
elements of a socially responsible market economy, the opposite is true for auto-
cracies, where economic freedoms are frequently restricted. This may be explained
by the fact that the constitutive liberties of economic citizenship and the participa-
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tory rights of political citizenship have required and reinforced each other in the
history of modern democracy.
Furthermore, the institutions of market economy and democracy also appear to be
interlinked. In the majority of countries, social differentiation triggered by the for-
ces of marketization has led to the emergence of democracy. On the one hand,
democratic rules to legitimize decisions and facilitate accountability have helped to
prevent socioeconomic conflicts from damaging the viability and legitimacy of the
economic system. Modern democracies, on the other hand, require a sufficient and
stable resource base which can only be provided by production processes organi-
zed as a market economy.
Although many arguments militate for a close interrelation of market economy
and democracy, this does not presage any “natural” sequence of development.
Asian states such as China and Singapore illustrate that the path to a market eco-
nomy can be combined with authoritarian regimes over long periods of time. For
those few countries that achieved spectacular economic development in the cour-
se of the last 50 years, the autocratic or democratic nature of the political system
did not matter, since the average growth of total income was nearly identical for
autocracies and democracies.44 Benchmarking countries against market-based
democracy does not imply that observable social changes and political reforms
necessarily and continually approach the aim of market-based democracy.
Development is conceived as path-dependent, not as historically efficient.
Stagnation and relapses into authoritarianism are just as much a possibility as
detours and asynchronicity in development.
4. The methodology of the Bertelsmann Transformation Index
The conceptual choices explained in the previous section have several consequen-
ces for the measurement and index construction.45 The complexity of concepts and
criteria, the large number of countries and the aim of cross-national comparabili-
ty suggest organizing the measurement as an expert poll based on in-depth coun-
try analyses rather than as a survey or as an exclusively numerical rating. The mea-
surement is therefore underpinned by country reports written by social scientists
with detailed country experience and knowhow. The purpose of these country
reports is to substantiate and explain the ratings given to a country, sketching a
holistic, contextualized view of the country’s situation and perspectives. The pre-
sent issue of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies contains updated and
annotated versions of these country reports.
Selection of countries. Since constitutional democracy and socially responsible
market economy are used as benchmarks to rate countries, the BTI criteria are
unlikely to sufficiently discriminate between countries that are already market-
based democracies. As such countries would cluster at the top of the rankings, the
board of scholars and practitioners supervising the BTI (“BTI Board”) decided to
exclude countries from the sample that can be considered as consolidated demo-
cracies and highly developed market economies, formally identified by their donor
status in the OECD.46
Assessment. The country experts assessed the 16 criteria according to a coding
manual that contains the 47 questions listed in tables 1-3 together with eight
Double review
Ensuring comparability
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questions to assess the trend of development and the level of structural difficulty
(see below). The manual explains all questions and proposes the wordings of four
different, graded answers per question. These “evaluation levels”cover the scope of
possible assessments and could be used as building blocks for formulating the
analysis, while not being mandatory components. For the Status Index, the experts
assessed the state of democracy and market economy in January 2005. For the
Management Index, experts took into account the period from January 2003 to
January 2005.
Each country report was reviewed twice, by an anonymous second country expert,
mostly from the country itself, and by an expert with a broad, comparativist know-
ledge of the region. The main purpose of the first review was to improve the vali-
dity and objectivity of the verbal assessment. The second review mainly served to
ensure that all criteria and questions were addressed by the author of the country
report. The country reports were revised on the basis of these reviews.
The numerical ratings are based on the four evaluation levels, but are further dif-
ferentiated into 10 different levels, with 1 representing the worst, and 10 represen-
ting the best rating. Raters thus were able to provide a more nuanced rating. The
ratings were derived from two independent sources. The first and the second coun-
try expert each suggested scores for all 47 (+8) questions.
To facilitate the rating and reduce bias, the country experts were provided with
exemplary country reports and ratings that allowed them to assess “their”country
in comparison with a “benchmark country” from their region of the world. The
ratings and analyses of these benchmark countries had been adjusted and calibra-
ted across world regions.
Two regional experts discussed these ratings and agreed upon a rating that reflec-
ted the differences among countries of the same world region. These regionally
calibrated ratings were reviewed by the BTI Board that recalibrated them in a cross-
regional comparison and established a consensus on the final ratings. The calibra-
tion discussions aimed at minimizing country and regional bias. The need for intra-
and interregional calibration implies that the final ratings may no longer corres-
pond fully to the rating expressed by the wording of the country reports.
Aggregation. The aggregation of scores into composite indicators is based on two
assumptions. First, the high degree of scale differentiation (ten levels) allows to
consider the ordinal rating scale as an approximation of an interval scale. Second,
in designing questions and criteria, care was taken to divide the concepts into cri-
teria of equal importance and to disaggregate criteria into questions of similar rele-
vance. Since no compelling conceptual reasons were identified that would have
justified a differentiation among criteria and questions according to their impor-
tance, the BTI Board decided to assign equal weights to (1) all criteria within the
three concepts and (2) all questions within the 16 criteria. This conceptual choice
can be empirically justified by a principal component analysis that shows that
more than 77 (68) per cent of the variance measured by the composite concepts
(and the individual criteria) can be explained by single underlying factors. This fin-
ding of highly correlated criteria and question ratings implies that assigning diffe-
rent weights to individual questions/ criteria would not introduce systematic bias
to the composite scores.47
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These assumptions permit the calculation of arithmetical means as the main proce-
dure to obtain the Status Index and the Management Index. As explained in section
3.4., the BTI assumes that market economy and democracy are functionally inter-
related. This justifies why the average ratings for market economy and democracy
are added to form one single index, the Status Index. In effect, this procedure
assigns equal weights to the democracy and the market economy components (not,
however, to the constituent criteria ratings). The empirical results of the BTI mea-
surement confirm the assumed interrelation of market economy and democracy by
a high (.749) and significant (p <0.01) correlation between the average ratings for
democracy and market economy, even if we control for the influence of income
levels. One intended effect of this aggregation procedure is that the BTI is biased in
favour of states that take democratic and economic reforms simultaneously.
The Management Index is determined as a separate index, following from the con-
ceptual distinction between constitutional democracy and socially responsible
market economy on the one hand, the performance of political actors on the other.
In order to construct this index, one has to consider that the underlying actor-
centered concept of governance analytically separates the management perfor-
mance of political actors from the structural constraints these actors are faced with.
It is, however, intuitively evident that structural difficulties such as poverty, lack of
education or protracted conflicts may severely restrict the management perfor-
mance. As this would lead to a systematic underestimation of good management
under difficult structural circumstances in relation to an equally good management
of comparatively easier tasks, the measurement should take into account the struc-
tural constraints of development and democratization.
Hence their impact is analyzed and classified as a Level of Difficulty. The difficul-
ty level reflects the levels of income and education achieved by a state, the intensi-
ty of conflicts, the existence of civil-society traditions and a state’s institutional
capacity. A low level of economic and educational development, the presence of
serious conflicts, a lack of civil-society traditions and weak state capacity represent
a high level of difficulty for a political leadership. The Level of Difficulty is calcu-
lated from qualitative ratings and quantitative data as shown in table 4 below.
Table 4: Construction of the Level of difficulty
1. Structural constraints on governance rated by country experts
2. Traditions of a civil society rated by country experts
3. Intensity of ethnic, religious or social conflict rated by country experts
4. Gross national income per capita, World Development Indicators, 2003,
purchasing power parities
5. Level/inclusiveness of education, Human Development Report, UN
Education Index
6. State capacity, Mean of BTI ratings for stateness and rule of law
=> Level of difficulty
(Unweighted mean of individual scores)
Trend indicators
Freedom House
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In a second step, the average rating for the four management criteria is multiplied
with the Level of Difficulty. This is justified by the fact that structural problems
such as high poverty, a history of violent conflict or the absence of civil society tra-
ditions are likely to affect all aspects of governance. The Level of Difficulty may
range between 1.0 (least difficult) and 1.25 (most difficult). The effect of such a
range is that the political leadership’s performance continues to play a decisive role
in the Management Index, while, as sensitivity tests have shown, the influence of
differential structural conditions is not neglected. The third and final step is to
rescale the resulting product to a scale with a maximum value of ten.48
In addition to the Status and Management Index, the BTI provides trend indicators
showing the direction and intensity of democratic and economic development.
These indicators are based on five questions – two on stateness and democracy,
three on socioeconomic development, institutional reform and economic perfor-
mance – that are rated by the country experts and then aggregated by averaging.
To maximize their validity and to simplify the presentation of the BTI, the trend
indicators denote only progress, continuity or decline.49
Aggregating indices and indicators according to the procedures described here
might, in theory, allow effective authoritarian states to compensate their lack of
democratic structures by high scores for economic reforms and good management.
However, such a compensation effect is limited by the design of the questions and
evaluation levels which envisage ceilings for the scores autocracies may be given.
Thus, a state like Singapore that combines autocratic government with a highly
developed market economy can only attain an intermediate position in the status
and management rankings.
The Management Index and the Status Index are displayed as rankings showing
the index values and the ranks for all 116 countries studied.50 The index values are
provided with two decimals which means that the third decimals are rounded. That
is, differences between index values that are smaller than 0.01 are not taken into
account for the ranking. In addition to the rankings, the disaggregated criteria
ratings are published. These ratings provide a detailed profile of each country’s
performance and enable readers to reconstruct the ranking of a country.
5. Conclusion
This article has outlined the concept and methodology of the BTI, a new index that,
we believe, constitutes a useful tool to assess the quality of democracy, market eco-
nomy and governance in Southeast European countries. The BTI differs from other
indices by focusing on the management performance of political actors, by using
broader, more demanding concepts of democracy and market economy and by
relying mostly on self-collected empirical evidence. In contrast to numerical
ratings on the one hand or purely qualitative comparisons of countries on the
other hand, the BTI allows readers to simultaneously compare countries and to
familiarize themselves with the state of affairs in individual countries.
We also think that the BTI addresses an important lacuna of research.
Comprehensive studies of democratization and market reforms in the region have
mainly focused on single country cases. An exception is the annual study “Nations
in Transit” conducted by the US-based non-governmental organization Freedom
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House.51 The Freedom House study provides ratings and assessments for the state
of democratization in 27 Central and East European countries. Six categories (elec-
toral process; civil society; governance; independent media; constitutional, legisla-
tive and judicial framework; corruption) are evaluated and aggregated into a
“Democracy Score”. Each category is further detailed in checklists of 6-10 ques-
tions that guide the country reporting and rating. In contrast with the BTI,
Freedom House does not rate governments per se and uses a broader notion of
governance, comprising “the stability of the governmental system, as well as legis-
lative and executive transparency; the ability of legislative bodies to fulfill their
law-making and investigative responsibilities; decentralization of power; the
responsibilities, election, and management of local governmental bodies; civil ser-
vice reform; and the freedom of the civil service from excessive political interfe-
rence and corruption.”52
Governance assessments by international agencies have so far been done mainly
for policy advise purposes, not with the aim of a systematic, analytically oriented
cross-national comparison. The most influential agency assessments have certain-
ly been the reports prepared by the EU Commission to monitor the progress made
by Western Balkan countries on the way toward EU association and membership.53
The Commission derives its assessment framework from the eligibility criteria for
EU accession defined by the EU member states in Copenhagen in 1993 (stable
democratic institutions; a functioning and competitive market economy; and the
capacity to implement the EU legislation). The reports are divided accordingly in a
political assessment, an economic assessment and an analysis of the country’s
ability to fulfill its contractual commitments regarding the EU. As the Copenhagen
criteria for accession are fairly broad, the Commission has specified them by ana-
lysing, e.g. in the case of the political assessment, the functioning of the main poli-
tical institutions.
While the reports provide detailed and well-informed empirical evidence, they do
not disclose the standards or reference points used to assess democracy or to
distinguish between serious democratic defects and the frictions occuring in eve-
ryday politics. Although grades of assessment have evolved over time, such as
“made progress”,“limited progress”,“further progress is needed”, it is unclear how
individual observations add up to a summary assessment. One reason for this
vagueness is the Commission’s limited discretion to provide detailed rules where
EU member states represent a plurality of institutional arrangements and claim the
exclusive power to take decisions on agreements with candidate countries. The
Commission reports are, in this respect, consultative documents, not systematic
derivations of EU judgments.
The World Bank tried to test the feasibility of constructing governance “scorecards”
for Southeast European states, based on its so-called “second generation gover-
nance indicators.”54 These quantitative indicators have been designed to provide
transparently generated and institutionally specific information on governance
deficiencies and for targeting institutional reforms. They differ from older and less
specific indicators that measured, for example, the degree of corruption. The feasi-
bility test, however, showed that it was rather difficult to obtain data from each
Balkan country and to achieve a consensus within the framework of the Stability
Pact Anti-Corruption Initiative (SPAI) on monitoring governance via peer review
mechanisms. In this respect, the project failed “due to a combination of dissatis-
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faction among participants with the proposed indicators, the scorecard peer moni-
toring approach or with the SPAI itself.”55
Governance indicators provided by non-governmental organizations are less
dependent on such settings with their consensus requirements. They may initiate
public discourses on better governance and encourage governments to engage in
peer review mechanisms and evidence-based policy making.
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